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The decline
and fall of
legislative
history?
Patterns of
Supreme Court
reliance in the
Burger and
Rehnquist eras
Reliance on legislative history in the Court's majority
opinions has fallen from nearly 50 percent during
the Burger era to less than 30 percent since 1985.
by JAMES J. BRUDNEY AND COREY DITSLEAR
T he United States Supreme Court's reliance onlegislative history to help explain and justify itsd cisions has d clined sharply over the past two
decades. Both federal judges and academics regularly dis-
agree on whether courts should consult the record of leg-
islative hearings, committee reports, and floor exchanges
that accompanies a congressional enactment.' In the
midst of this spirited debate, the Rehnquist Court
embarked on a substantial departure from past practice.
An examination of some 650 majority opinions in the
area of workplace law reveals that reliance on legislative
history has fallen from nearly 50 percent during the
Burger era to less than 30 percent since 1985.
The Court's receding faith in legislative history is often
attributed to the influence ofJustice Antonin Scalia, who
has consistently criticized use of this resource as an aid to
1. For disagreement among Supreme Court justices, see Stephen Breyer,
ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 85-101 (New
York: Random House, 2005); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History
in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); Antonin Scalia, A MAT-
TER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 29-37 (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1997).
220 JUDICATURE Volume 89, Number 4 January-February 2006
HeinOnline  -- 89 Judicature 220 2005-2006
interpretation. Although Justice
Scalia's role has surely been impor-
tant, what about the contribution of
other justices, who author some
eight-ninths of the Court's decisions?
Does the Court's diminished
appetite for legislative history extend
equally to all subject matter areas
within a given field of law? Further,
in a doctrinal field where federal
statutes are consistently liberal or
redistributive in orientation, does
the Court rely on legislative history
more often to support liberal results
than conservative outcomes? Finally,
is there an ideological "tilt" associ-
ated with legislative history reliance
by liberal or conservative justices?
Focus on these questions helps
explain why the Rehnquist Court
curtailed the use of legislative history
as part of its reasoning process.
There has been a recent upsurge of
interest among legal and social sci-
ence scholars in analyzing judicial
reasoning from an empirical per-
spective.' Examining how the justices
use legislative history to support
their decisions offers insights for
lower courts and attorneys as they
consider legislative history argu-
ments in future cases. In addition,
2. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et. al., Judging Statutes:
Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation and Notes for a
Project on the Internal Revenue Code, 13 WASH. U.J.L.
& PoL'y 305 (2003); Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey
A. Segal, An Original Look at Originalism, 36 LAw &
Soc'y REv. 113 (2002); Jane S. Schacter, The Con-
founding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme
Court Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative
History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. RiV. 1
(1998); Gregory C. Sisk et. al., Charting the Influ-
ences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study ofJudi-
cial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1377, 1434-50,
1493-98 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
398 U.S. 375, 397 (1970) (relying on committee
reports to clarify inconclusive text); Webb v.
Board of Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 241 n.16 (1985)
(relying on committee reports to reinforce appar-
ent meaning of text.
4. Other scholars analyzing the Court's use of
assessing the Court's principled justi-
fications for its holdings sheds light
on the persuasiveness of judicial
decision making; this in turn influ-
ences perceptions about the legiti-
macy of courts in general.
The dataset for this study consists
of every United States Supreme
Court decision involving the law of
the workplace from the start of the
Burger Court in 1969 through the
end of the Rehnquist Court in 2005.
This broad category encompasses
649 decisions-primarily statutory
but also constitutional-that
address union-management rela-
tions, employment discrimination,
safety and health, minimum wage
and overtime standards, retirement
benefits, employee privacy and free-
dom of expression, and even the
immigration or tax consequences of
individuals' status and conditions
while on the job. Within the work-
place law field we have identified
eight distinct subject matter cate-
gories: seven covering claims that
relate to different statutory
schemes, and the eighth covering
decisions that apply provisions of
the Constitution. Measured in
three-year intervals, workplace law
legislative history have focused on the number of
times such history is cited in the justices' opinions.
See Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S.
Supreme Court and the Use ofLegislative Histories: A Sta-
tistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 297-98
(1982); Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court 'iDeclin-
ing Reliance en Legislative History: The Impact ofJustice
Scalia's Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 369, 384-85
(1999). We distinguish between interpretive
resources that are merely referenced or discussed
but not relied on, and resources that are affirma-
tively relied on as a probative or determining factor
to support the majority's reasoning process. In this
regard, when the majority invokes a resource (such
as legislative history or a language canon) in order
to dismiss the value ascribed to it by a litigant, a
lower court, or a dissenting justice, we do not con-
sider that affirmative reliance: the majority has
"deflected" the resource rather than using it as an
asset to justify or buttress the Court's holding.
cases have formed a remarkably sta-
ble portion of the Court's docket
since the mid 1970s, about one-sixth
of all merits decisions.
Methods
The purpose of the research
reported here is to explore the
Court's reasoning techniques, specif-
ically reliance on various interpretive
resources to help the majority reach
its result. Legislative history is one
such resource for the Court. The
Court makes use of committee
reports, floor debates, hearings, or
other legislative record evidence that
it finds indicative of the legislative
intent underlying the text that is sub-
ject to dispute. For instance, the
Court may refer explicitly to a com-
mittee report discussion to clarify the
meaning of inconclusive statutory
language, or to reinforce that such
language was intended to apply in a
certain way.'
Apart from legislative history, we
have coded for nine other interpre-
tive resources on which the justices
rely with some frequency. These are:
(1) the plain or ordinary meaning of
textual language; (2) dictionaries;
(3) language canons; (4) legislative
purpose; (5) legislative inaction; (6)
Supreme Court precedent; (7) com-
mon law precedent; (8) substantive
canons; and (9) agency deference.
The Court's opinions almost always
identify at least two interpretive
resources as probative of its decision,
and the vast majority recognize three
or more. Identifying a resource's
probative role in the majority's affir-
mative reasoning process casts a
sharper light on the Court's justifica-
tions for its decisions.4
The relationship between the
Court's use of interpretive resources
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and the ideological direction of its
opinions is also explored. Accord-
ingly, all 649 workplace cases are
classified according to whether the
Court's legal outcome favored
employees (liberal) or employers
(conservative). In addition, each of
the 19 justices who served during
this time is identified as either lib-
eral or conservative, relying on vot-
ing scores derived from the Spaeth
Supreme Court database.5
Declining reliance
As noted at the outset and in Figure
1, the Court's interest in legislative
history has declined sharply over
time. Court reliance for the entire
36 year period stands at 38 percent,
but the level of reliance has fallen
between the Burger and Rehnquist
eras from 47 percent to 29 percent, a
statistically significant decrease. This
downward trend becomes even
sharper when constitutional deci-
sions, which not surprisingly feature
very little reliance on legislative his-
tory, are excluded. Omitting deci-
sions on constitutional matters, the
Court's reliance on legislative history
declined from 51 percent during the
Burger years to 29 percent in the
Rehnquist era.
As Figure 1 indicates, the turning
point in the Court's appetite for leg-
islative history as a reasoning asset
came in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Reliance declined from 50
percent in the 1986 term to 33 per-
cent during the following three
terms (1987-89) and to 17 percent
for the 1990-92 terms. Legislative his-
tory usage then leveled off at 23 per-
cent for almost a decade before
rebounding in the last three terms to
37 percent. While the 2002 and 2003
terms featured Court reliance at 43
percent, the 2004 term level was only
17 percent; more time is needed to
determine if the two preceding
terms were anomalies rather than
the start of a long-term resurgence.
Individual justices
Authoring an opinion for the Court
is hardly an exercise in judicial inde-
pendence. Justices face a number of
constraints when writing for four or
more colleagues. Opinion assign-
ments may reflect case-specific con-
siderations, including the need to
solidify a fragile majority or the
desire to utilize an individual justice's
expertise on a particular issue, as well
as broader institutional factors such
as a preference for equalizing work-
load. In addition, the contours of a
Court opinion will likely be shaped to
some extent by the contentions of
the litigants. Still, the justices retain
ample discretion when explaining
and defending the results reached,
provided they are able to retain at
least four other votes.
Table 1 reports justices' reliance
on legislative history in their majority
opinions, listing total number of
majority opinions in parenthesis for
each of the 16 justices who served
between 1969 and 2005 and who
authored at least 10 majority opin-
ions.7 Forjustices whose tenure spans
5. We obtained ideology scores for the justices
individually based on their votes through the 1999-
2000 term on a range of Spaeth database issue
codes that included civil rights, union-related, and
selected economic issues, Harold J. Spaeth, THE
ORIGINAL U.S. SUPREME COURT JUDIcAL DATABASE
1953-2003 Terms, http://www.as.uky.edu/poli-
isci/ulmerproject/sctdata.htm. For a more
detailed discussion of how we assembled our data-
base, see James J. Brudney and Corey Ditslear,
Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neu-
tral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 15-29 (2005).
6. We designate results as significant at the .05
level (t < .05). All statistical analyses in this article
are run using Stata version 7.
7. Justice Douglas authored nine majority opin-
ions during this period;Justices Black and Harlan
authored four each. Douglas relied on legislative
history in 44% of his Court opinions (four of
both the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts, reliance is reported sepa-
rately for each period, again listing
the number of majority opinions in
parenthesis.
The most striking feature of the
variations among individual justices
is the record of Justices Scalia and
Clarence Thomas. Justice Scalia has
long proclaimed his distrust of leg-
islative history as a resource, andJus-
tice Thomas has followed his lead.9
Scalia's appointment to ChiefJustice
Warren Burger's seat in 1986, and
Thomas's arrival as a replacement
for Justice Thurgood Marshall in
1992, together account for a large
part of the Court's diminished will-
ingness to rely on legislative history.
Nearly one-half of the Court's
decline in legislative history reliance
since 1986 is attributable to the opin-
ion-writing performances of Justices
Scalia and Thomas.1 Justice Anthony
nine); Harlan in 50% (two of four), and Black in
75% (three of four). We omit them from this table
based on their minimal levels of participation,
which in turn reflect brief periods of service on the
Burger Court. In 22 of the 649 cases in our dataset,
the Court delivered its holding and principal rea-
soning in a plurality opinion. We treat these plu-
rality opinions as majorities for purposes of our
analyses.
8. See, e.g., Scalia's concurring opinion as a
member of the D.C. Circuit in Hirschey v. FERC,
777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (1985); see also Scalia, supra n. 1, at
29-37; Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501
U.S. 597, 616-23 (1991) (Scalia,J., concurring).
9. See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510
U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia and Thomas,MJ., con-
curring); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170,
172 n.1 (1993) (reflecting views ofJJ. Scalia and
Thomas).
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Figure 1. Legislative history reliance
over time
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Table 1: Legislative history reliance by
justices authoring 10 or more
majority opinions
Legislative
history %
Burger years
65 (37)
59 (17)
54 (54)
52 (33)
46 (28)
53 (49)
N/A
48 (29)
N/A
40 (5)
N/A
24 (33)
22 (32)
N/A
N/A
N/A
Legislative
history %
Rehnquist years
50 (16)
N/A
60 (15)
N/A
45 (20)
18 (17)
44 (23)
32 (34)
36 (14)
30 (43)
29 (14)
67 (3)
33 (15)
23 (26)
4 (28)
0 (24)
* t-test reveals significant difference between that justice's reliance and reliance in decisions authored by all other
justices. Overall mean for legislative history reliance is 38%.
Number of majority opinions for each justice in parenthesis.
Justice
Marshall
Burger
Brennan
Stewart
Blackmun
White
Souter
Stevens
Ginsburg
O'Connor
Breyer
Powell
Rehnquist
Kennedy
Scalia
Thomas
Kennedy, another Rehnquist era
appointee, also has been a notably
infrequent user of legislative history
in his majority opinions, and he too
has expressed skepticism regarding
its reliability in general.11
In addition, Table 1 reveals inter-
esting differences in legislative his-
tory reliance among the six justices
who contributed at least 10 majority
opinions during both the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts. Justice Byron
White relied far less frequently on
legislative history in his Rehnquist
10. We determined that there has been a
decline of 17.36% in legislative history reliance
(from 46.12 to 28.76) when comparing majority
opinions by Justice Burger (who served until the
start of the Rehnquist era) plus the Burger era
majorities authored by the eight "continuing
Justices" (who served for part or all of the Rehn-
quist years) as against all majorities written dur-
ing the Rehnquist era. Majorities written by
Justices Scalia and Thomas (when appropriately
weighted based on their proportional contribu-
tion to the Rehnquist era total of 299 decisions)
constitute 7.99% out of 17.36%, or 46.0% of the
decline.
11. See, e.g., Public Employees Retirement Sys-
tem v. Betts, 491 U.S. 158, 168 (1989); Public Cit-
izen v. United States Dept. ofJustice, 491 U.S. 440,
justice Antonin Ncalia
has long proclaimed his
distrust of legislative
history as a resource.
era majority opinions than he had
during the Burger years; Justice John
Paul Stevens' and Justice Marshall's
470-73 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
12. Of the three other justices who made sub-
stantial workplace law contributions in both eras,
Justice Blackmun's use of legislative history
remained constant while Justices Brennan and
Rehnquist actually increased their reliance on leg-
islative history after 1985. Justice Rehnquist, how-
ever, was an infrequent user of legislative history
overall, even with the heightened reliance that
followed his elevation to chief justice.
13. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511,
518 n.12 (1993) (Justice Stevens for Court major-
ity); United States v. Thompson/Center Arms
Co., 504 U.S. 505, 516 n.8 (1992) (Justice Souter
for Court majority); Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v.
Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610-12 n.4 (1991) (Justice
White for Court majority).
reliance on legislative history also
declined noticeably during their
years on the Rehnquist Court. Tak-
ing these three justices together,
reliance on legislative history
declined from 56 percent (64 of 115
majority opinions) to 33 percent (22
of 67 majority opinions), a signifi-
cant decrease.1t
Justice Scalia's commitment to
avoiding reliance on legislative his-
tory may have exerted an important
ripple effect. During Scalia's early
years on the Court, several justices
took issue with his openly expressed
hostility toward legislative history.13
Two of those colleagues, however-
Justices White and Stevens-made
considerably less use of such history
in opinions they authored after 1985.
Further, Justice Stephen Breyer, who
vigorously defended the uses of leg-
islative history while an appellate
court judge, has relied on that
resource less often than Justice Harry
Blackmun, whom he replaced,
although Breyer's volume of work-
www.ajs.org JUDICATURE 223
Legislative
history %
All years
60* (53)
59 (17)
55* (69)
52 (33)
46 (48)
44 (66)
44 (23)
40 (63)
36 (14)
31 (48)
29 (14)
28 (36)
26* (47)
23* (26)
4* (28)
0* (24)
Justice John Paul
Stevens' reliance on
legislative history in
majority opinions
noticeably declined
during the Rehnquist
Court years.
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place law decisions is not yet very
large.
These three justices, and perhaps
others as well, may have come to
regard analysis based on legislative
history as less important in explain-
ing or justifying a result.14 The Rehn-
quist Court as a whole relied more
often than its Burger era counter-
part on a linguistic approach tojudi-
cial reasoning, focused on text,
dictionaries, and language canons,
and less often on the primary inten-
tionalist resources of legislative his-
tory and purpose. Faced with the
outspoken position adopted by Jus-
tice Scalia and later Justice Thomas,
other justices may have concluded,
even if subconsciously, that relying
regularly on legislative history risked
diminishing the prospects of attract-
ing or retaining the allegiance of
their colleagues. In this regard,
roughly one-third of the Court's
reduced reliance on legislative his-
tory appears to be attributable to
changes in the opinion-writing of the
eight "continuing justices"-those
who served in both the Burger and
Rehnquist eras.15
Subject matter areas
The decline in legislative history
usage may be linked not only to
changes in the Court's membership
but also to the varied subject matter
composition of workplace law. Con-
gress's regulatory initiatives in some
areas are more recently promulgated
than in others; there also may be dif-
ferences in the volume or detail of
legislative history materials that
accompany a given statutory scheme.
Table 2 identifies two subject mat-
ter categories that are associated
with unusually high Court reliance
on legislative history. Majority opin-
ions interpreting race or sex dis-
crimination statutes and opinions
applying minimum standards laws
made significantly more use of leg-
islative history compared with the
baseline rate of reliance. In addi-
tion, two subject matter areas-gen-
eral negligence statutes and
constitutional decisions-are associ-
ated with unusually low Court
reliance on legislative history.
Table 2: Legislative history reliance by
subject matter category
Legislative
history %
Issue All years
Labor relations (192) 33
Race or sex discr. (138) 47*
General discr. (54) 41
Min. standards (71) 54*
Retirement (62) 45
General negligence (23) 9*
Misc. (46) 44
Constitutional (134) 10*
Legislative
history %
Burger years
39
56
87
70
60
25
50
9
Legislative
history %
Rehnquist years
19 #
33 #
23 #
40 #
40
5
39
11
* t-test reveals significant difference in reliance for all years between that issue area and all other issue areas.
# t-test reveals significant difference in reliance for that issue area between the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.
Table 2 also indicates the decline
in Court reliance is most pro-
nounced in four subject matter
areas. For statutory decisions
addressing labor relations, race or
sex discrimination, general discrimi-
nation (primarily age in this
dataset), and minimum standards,
the Court's use of legislative history
has declined significantly from the
Burger to the Rehnquist years.
The latter three of these four areas
are dominated by federal laws
enacted either just prior to 1969 or
early in the Burger Court era." For
statutes enacted in the 1960s and
14. There is another possible explanation for
this downturn: strategic choices made by
Supreme Court advocates may be influencing the
justices' willingness to rely on legislative history.
Given the steadfast hostility expressed by two jus-
tices, litigants before the Court may have con-
cluded they should reduce reliance on the
legislative history resource when presenting their
legal positions. We explored this hypothesis on a
preliminary basis by reviewing the parties' merits
briefs for all workplace law cases decided in two
terms at the end of the Burger era (1984 and
1985) when the Court's legislative history reliance
was quite high, and two terms in the middle of the
Rehnquist era (1992 and 1997) when the Court's
legislative history reliance was extraordinarily low.
We found no evidence that the litigants in these
four terms became more reluctant to advance leg-
islative history as a resource that might justify a
Court decision, even in cases where the Court's
opinion reflects no reliance on legislative history.
We also reviewed the tables of contents for these
merits briefs to see whether the parties used the
words "legislative history" as part of a separate
argument heading or subheading. Here too, we
found the parties appear at least as willing to fea-
ture legislative history as a distinct argument in
the 1990s as they had been in the mid 1980s.
Whether Supreme Court litigants have gradually
1970s, legislative history may have
been deemed especially valuable in
the initial round of Court decisions,
as the justices grappled for the first
time with discerning congressional
intent. With regard to Title VII, for
example, the Court had to address
contentious disputes involving the
often inconclusive text Congress
approved in 1964. In its first genera-
tion of Title VII decisions, the jus-
tices relied heavily on legislative
history to help explain inter alia the
scope of the Court's remedial
authority under the Act, the federal
government's ability to seek class-
come to rely less prominenty or less often on leg-
islative history arguments in recent years would
require more in-depth study, especially given the
Court's own increased reliance in two of the past
three terms.
15. The exact figures are 5.62 out of 17.36, or
32.4% of the decline; seenote 10, supra, for related
discussion. The remaining one-fifth of the Court's
diminished reliance (3.75 out of 17.36, or 21.6%
of the decline) is associated with the opinion writ-
ing of newcomer justices other than Scalia and
Thomas: Justice Kennedy (who replaced Powell),
Justice Breyer (who replaced Blackmun), Justice
Souter (who replaced Brennan), andJustice Gins-
burg (who replaced White).
16. Over three-fourths of all race and sex dis-
crimination decisions involve interpretation of
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. With respect
to general discrimination, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 accounts for more
than two-fifths of all decisions-more than twice
the number arising under any other statutory
scheme that addresses discrimination beyond
race or sex. In the minimum standards area, over
three-fourths of the Court's decisions construe
one of four statutory schemes initially enacted or
substantially amended between 1966 and 1977,
and dealing with worker safety and health or basic
compensation and overtime standards.
224 JUDICATURE Volume 89, Number 4 January-February 2006
HeinOnline  -- 89 Judicature 224 2005-2006
wide relief, and the legality of affir-
mative action.17
As a statute matures and its origi-
nal legislative history fades further
into the past, the Court may come to
view the detailed pre-enactment
record as less relevant, in part
because new sources of authority
have arisen to clarify the meaning of
the enacted text. For Title VII deci-
sions, one such source is Supreme
Court precedent: the Court's own
intervening interpretations may cre-
ate a baseline understanding of cer-
tain provisions or concepts. Thus, for
example, in a 1987 case challenging
an affirmative action preference for
female applicants, the Court relied
heavily on the holding and analysis
from its seminal 1979 decision to
delineate further the lawful contours
of affirmative action."i Similarly, the
Court has relied on precedent in the
area of sexual harassment law to
refine the scope of employer liability
for discriminatory harassment by
supervisors. 9 Another source that
17. See Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747, 758-66
(1976); General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318,
325-29 (1980); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 201-08 (1979).
18. SeeJohnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616,
627-40 (1987). As was true for race or sex dis-
crimination cases in general, the Court's use of
legislative history in Title VII decisions declined
significantly between the Burger and Rehnquist
years, from 52% to 31%.
19. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 786-88, 804-07 (1998).
20. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457-
62 (1997) (applying Fair Labor Standards Act);
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Schwalb, 493 U.S. 40,
47-48 (1989) (applying Longshore and Harbor
Workers Compensation Act); Mullins Coal v.
Director, Office of Workers Comp., 484 U.S. 135,
159-60 (1987) (applying Black Lung Act).
21. Our dataset does not extend back to the
1950s and 1960s, when key provisions of the
NLRA had just been enacted, but a previous study
suggests that the Court found NLRA legislative
history more reliable as a resource during those
may effectively diminish reliance on
a gradually aging legislative history
record is agency deference, whereby
the intervening construction of a
textual provision by the agency
charged with enforcement is then
endorsed by the Court."
The notion that the Court may
find legislative history less helpful as
a statute ages is supported by exami-
nation of the labor relations cate-
gory. The National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) dominates this subject
area with over four-fifths of all deci-
sions. The NLRA was enacted in
1935 and had its last major revision
in 1959. Although there is a rich leg-
islative record accompanying the
1935, 1947, and 1959 enactments,
the Court's reliance on legislative
history when interpreting labor rela-
tions statutes during the Burger era
was below the baseline level of
reliance for that 17-year period.
Importantly, the Burger Court's
reliance on legislative history when
interpreting the NLRA was signifi-
earlier decades. See Beth Henschen, Judicial Use of
Legislative History and Intent in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 10 LEGIS. STUDIES Q. 353, 360-65 (1985).
Using a different methodology, Henschen ana-
lyzed all 124 NLRA cases decided by the Court
between 1950 and 1972.
22. See, e.g., ABF Freight Systems v. NLRB, 510
U.S. 317, 322-25 (1994); NLRB v. Curtin-Mathe-
son, 494 U.S. 775, 786-96 (1990); Fall River Dye-
ing Co. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 36-53 (1987);
Lechmere v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 534-40 (1992)
(Supreme Court precedent only).
23. In the Burger era, there are 3.94 resources
per decision when legislative history is relied on and
2.5 resources per decision when legislative history is
not a factor. The corresponding figures for Rehn-
quist era decisions are 4.50 and 2.88. Given that our
coding approach allows for up to ten resources per
majority opinion (nine in opinions without legisla-
tive history), one also could describe the reduction
in resources used as roughly 12% when comparing
majorities relying on legislative history with majori-
ties having no such reliance: 39% v. 28% in the
Burger era, and 45% v. 32% in the Rehnquist years.
canly lower than its reliance on this
resource when construing three
major statutes from other subject
matter areas, all initially enacted
between 1964 and 1974. The three
major statutory schemes include
Title VII (1964), the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (ADEA)
(1967), and the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA)
(1974). Legislative history reliance
during the Burger years was 52 per-
cent for 65 Title VII decisions, 100
percent for eight ADEA decisions, 60
percent for 10 ERISA decisions, and
33 percent for 83 NLRA decisions.
2 1
Further, while the principal laws in
the labor relations category were
more than two decades old at the
start of the Burger Court era, they
were at least half a century old by the
late 1990s. The justices evidently
found legislative history even less use-
ful as guidance when resolving labor
relations controversies several gener-
ations removed from Congress's pre-
enactment deliberative processes
rather than merely one or two. The
significant decline in reliance within
this category from the Burger to the
Rehnquist years may again reflect the
influence of intervening authority-
both Supreme Court precedent and
deference to agency determina-
tions. 2
Interestingly, the Court's declining
reliance on legislative history seems
to be more a matter of attrition than
substitution. The Rehnquist Court
uses a slightly higher number of
interpretive resources per decision
than did the Burger Court. The dif-
ference reflects a significant increase
in Rehnquist era reliance on textual
meaning, dictionaries, canons of
construction, and common law
precedent that more than offsets the
Court's diminished use of legislative
history. Yet when legislative history is
not used, the number of resources
per decision actually declines by
more than one in both Burger and
Rehnquist Court majority opinions."
The justices apparently have con-
cluded that while legislative history
can help to explain and justify a
result, its absence does not leave a
gap that needs to be filled.
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Whether subject matter variations
are as influential as the justices' indi-
vidual roles authoring majority opin-
ions is an area that warrants more
nuanced examination. The record
regarding the 1990 Americans with
Disabilities Act-construed by the
Court in 12 majority opinions, only
two of which rely on its extensive leg-
islative history-suggests that the
"statutory aging" hypothesis
advanced for some federal laws is not
applicable across the board.
Nonetheless, it does seem that the
relative maturity of a statutory
scheme influences the Court's
changing patterns of legislative his-
tory reliance.
Ideological direction
Table 1 discloses that four of the five
most conservative members of the
Rehnquist Court are at best reluctant
users of legislative history, while two
of the most liberal justices who
served during the combined
period-Justices William Brennan
and Marshall-regard legislative his-
tory with special favor. This raises the
possibility that legislative history
reliance during our 36-year time
span has a distinctly liberal or pro-
employee tilt. Such an inference is at
least plausible given that Congress in
the workplace law area has consis-
tently acted to further a broad pro-
employee intent. Statutes approved
from the 1930s to the early 1990s
have had as their basic purpose to
augment the legal protections avail-
able to employees and thereby pro-
mote economic security and
individual dignity in the American
workplace.
In fact, however, legislative history
findings for the Court as a whole do
not support a liberal or pro-employee
tilt. Sorting the Court's entire body of
decisions according to ideological
direction reveals that legislative his-
tory reliance is fairly evenly distrib-
uted. It is used to help explain 40
percent of the 310 decisions that
reach a liberal or pro-employee
result, 37 percent of the 291 decisions
that arrive at a conservative or pro-
employer outcome, and 35 percent of
the 48 indeterminate ideology deci-
Table 3: Outcomes associated with
legislative history reliance by
selected justices
Leg. history
reliance %
Liberal justices
Liberal Conservative
decision decision
46(205) 50(117)
Conservative justices
Liberal Conservative
decision decision
15(53) 22 (112)
Total number of majority opinions for each outcome in parenthesis.
Justices William Brennan
and Thurgood Marshall
regard legislative history
with special favor. This
raises the possibility
that legislative history
reliance during our 36-
year time span has a
distinctly liberal tilt.
sions (favoring neither employees
nor employers in clear terms). The
difference between legislative his-
tory's contribution to outcomes that
favor employees as opposed to
employers is not significant.
With respect to the 249 decisions
out of 649 that rely on legislative his-
tory, 50 percent reach liberal results,
43 percent have conservative out-
comes, and 7 percent are indetermi-
nate. The distribution is slightly
more favorable to employees than
the ratios for the 400 decisions that
do not rely on legislative history, but
again the difference is not signifi-
cant. Looking at all 649 decisions, 48
percent reach liberal results, 45 per-
cent have conservative outcomes,
and 7 percent are indeterminate.
Ideology of the justices
Even though legislative history
reliance by the Court as a whole is
not associated with a distinctly liberal
or conservative direction, it remains
possible that the use of this resource
is ideologically linked in the hands of
certain conservative or liberal jus-
tices. To consider that possibility, the
study assessed legislative history
usage for two ideologically identifi-
able subgroups: the five most conser-
vative members of the Rehnquist
Court (justices William Rehnquist,
Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and San-
dra Day O'Connor) and the eight
most liberal justices who served for at
least 10 years on the Rehnquist or
Burger Courts (Justices Marshall,
Brennan, Stevens, David Souter,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Breyer, Black-
mun, and White).24
Table 3 shows that liberal justices
are basically outcome-neutral in
their pattern of reliance on legisla-
tive history, although conservative
justices are less so. Predictably in
light of their overall voting patterns,
liberal justices author far more
24. Voting scores reflect the percentages of
cases in which a justice casts votes favoring the
legal position of individuals, employees, or unions
on civil rights, union-related, and economic issues
coded by Professor Spaeth (see note 5, supra). The
Spaeth issue code scores for the five conservative
justices range from 28% (Thomas) to 46%
(O'Connor); scores for the eight liberal justices
range from 81% (Marshall) to 60% (White).
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Table 4: Comparing outcomes: decisions relying on legislative
history versus decisions not relying on legislative history*
% decisions relying on LH
% decisions not relying on LH
Liberal
decision
57
60
Liberal justices
Conservative
decision
35
32
Total #
decisions
(165)
(185)
Libera
decisio
24
32
Conservative justices
I Conservative
n decision c
74
63
* Percentages do not add up to 100 because the total number of decisions for both liberal and conservative justices includes cases with indeterminate ideology that are not
reported here.
majority opinions reaching pro-
employee results (205 versus 117)
while conservative justices write
more majority opinions favoring
employers (112 to 53). Further,
when authoring majority opinions
that reach either pro-employee or
pro-employer results, the eight liber-
als use legislative history more than
twice as often as the Rehnquist Court
conservatives (46-50 percent versus
15-22 percent). This too is under-
standable, given that four Rehnquist
Court conservatives are the four low-
est users of legislative history among
all the justices, and two of the liber-
als-Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall-are at the very high end
relative to their colleagues.
More surprising, however, is that
for both wings of the Court legisla-
tive history usage points in the same
ideological direction-away from the
pro-employee purposes of the statutes them-
selves. For liberal justices, legislative
history reliance is associated with a
slight moderating tendency: liberals
use legislative history to support pro-
employer results somewhat more
often than pro-employee outcomes.
Conservative justices also rely on leg-
islative history to justify pro-
employer results more often than
pro-employee outcomes: that ten-
dency is more predictable, given
conservatives' ideological orienta-
tion on workplace law issues. These
differences are not significant for
either subgroup of justices. Still, the
fact that legislative history reliance
for basically liberal workplace
statutes even tilts in such a pro-
employer direction is intriguing.
The pro-employer tendency is
more pronounced when comparing
outcomes for the two sets of justices
in decisions that rely on legislative
history versus decisions that do not.
As Table 4 indicates, decisions
authored by the eight liberal justices
that rely on legislative history reach
liberal outcomes 22 percent more
often than they produce conserva-
tive results. By contrast, the liberal
justices reach liberal outcomes 28
percent more often than conserva-
tive results in decisions without leg-
islative history. The results for our
five conservative justices point dis-
tinctly in a pro-employer direction;
although the number of decisions is
smaller, the results are significant.
The conservative justices reach con-
servative results 50 percent more
often than liberal results when rely-
ing on legislative history, but only 31
percent more often when not relying
on legislative history.
For Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, the same moderating associa-
tion is present that was observed for
the liberal justices as a group: their
majority opinions using legislative
history were more supportive of
employers than their majority opin-
ions that did not rely on this
resource. In Justice Brennan's case,
majority opinions relying on legisla-
tive history were 16 percent conser-
vative and 71 percent liberal; those
not relying on legislative history were
13 percent conservative and 81 per-
cent liberal. ForJustice Marshall, the
ratios were 25 percent conservative
and 66 percent liberal in majority
opinions relying on legislative his-
tory, but 19 percent conservative and
71 percent liberal in majority opin-
ions not relying on legislative history.
Why is legislative history reliance
associated with a slight moderating
trend for the liberal wing of the
Court? More broadly, how does leg-
islative history accompanying liberal
pro-employee statutes end up being
relied on to support conservative
pro-employer outcomes almost half
the time?
Exploring answers
There are several observations worth
making when exploring possible
answers to these questions. Initially,
the fact that workplace law statutes
enacted by Congress favor legal
interests of employees does not
mean the enacted provisions or
accompanying legislative records are
monolithic. Complex and compre-
hensive legislative schemes such as
Title VII, ERISA, and the NLRA
inevitably involve compromises
among competing interests. Negotia-
tion of various tradeoffs and adjust-
ments is reflected in the work
product of authorizing committees
and the floor debates in both houses
of Congress. Legislators understand
they are voting for employee rights
and protections in some overarching
sense, but they also know those
rights and protections are being rec-
onciled with the need to maintain
business operations in an efficient
and not unduly burdensome man-
ner.
Congress regularly accommodates
such major and minor legislative
objectives in order to further its pol-
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icy-making agenda. In this context,
there are several principled or
coherent ways that legislative history
may be used to defend conservative
or pro-employer results even as the
Court applies the terms of a liberal
or pro-employee statute. Three such
classifications occur with some fre-
quency in the workplace law area;
they are relied on by liberal justices,
notjust conservative ones.
First, there is legislative history
that explains employer defenses or
exemptions included in the statutory
language. In a considerable number
of cases, the Court has used legisla-
tive history to confirm or establish
that Congress intended employers to
be immune from liability for certain
business judgments, even if those
judgments in some sense aggravate
the discriminatory conditions at
which the law is aimed.
2 5
Second, the Court has looked to
legislative history that establishes a
compromise occurred between supporters
and opponents on the issue in question.
The existence of this compromise is
manifested in the legislative record,
either through evidence of a con-
crete give and take between mem-
bers from both sides or through
evidence that Congress simply
"agreed to disagree" on the issue,
inviting the courts to make the call. 6
Finally, the Court has invoked leg-
islative history to demonstrate that
employees and their supporters have over-
reached in their claims. Typically, the
Court analyzes this legislative history
to establish that the asserted right,
protection, or remedy simply was not
envisioned by the Congress that
enacted the language under dis-
pute."
Apart from these three doctrinal
factors, the justices may have strate-
gic reasons for using a liberal
statute's legislative history to support
conservative results. Justices author-
ing majority opinions may turn to
legislative history primarily to coun-
teract legislative history arguments
offered in dissent. Over 40 percent
of the Court's decisions relying on
this resource also feature a dissent-
ing opinion urging that legislative
history justifies the opposite conclu-
sion. More than half of these "duel-
ing legislative history" cases (53 out
of 101) involve conservative results:
the majority uses legislative history to
help defend its pro-employer out-
come while the dissent contends that
the legislative record supports the
employee's position. In some cases,
the majority author may have added
legislative history discussion in
response to-or in anticipation of-
the dissent's argument based on evi-
dence of Congress's intent.
To be sure, the presence of com-
peting legislative history arguments
may reflect a dissent's response to the
majority's initiative rather than a
majority author's strategic after-
thought or preemptive strike. More-
over, even when the justices invoke
legislative history in a majority opin-
ion to further such strategic ends, the
majority author presumably has some
principled or coherent grounds for
maintaining that the history invoked
actually supports the Court's legal
conclusion. If this were not true, the
majority would likely ignore the leg-
islative history resource altogether, or
else maintain that it is not relevant to
resolving the controversy at hand."s
It is important to examine further
this provisional determination that
deliberative materials accompanying
a statute aimed broadly in one ideo-
logical direction are being used in
coherent ways to defend specific
results pointing in the opposite
25. See, e.g., Albertson's Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527
U.S. 555, 573-74 (1999) ( Souter, J.); Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243-45 (1989)
(Brennan, J.); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 463
U.S. 85, 98-100 (1983) (Blackmun,J.).
26. See, e.g., Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511
U.S. 244, 250-63 (1994) (Stevens, J.); Jackson
Transit Authority v. Local Division 1285, Amalga-
mated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 24-28 (1982)
(Blackmun, J.); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S.
807, 818-24 (1980) ( Stevens, J.).
27. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 71-72, 81 (1977) (White,J.); Espinoza
v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J.); Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pitts-
butgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 166-68 (1971)
(Brennan, J.).
28. There are 57 decisions in which the dissent
relies on legislative history and the majority does
not. Some of these decisions that reach conserva-
tive results appear to reflect an ideologically-
linked determination to reject legislative history
evidence as irrelevant. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Sutton v.
United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999); EEOC v.
Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
29. Although we found that legislative history
reliance was basically neutral in outcome terms,
direction. Legislative history has
been criticized as too easily manipu-
lated based on its subjective and
political character. The findings here
indicate, however, that the relatively
neutral aspects of legislative history
reliance, especially by liberal justices,
may be explained at least in part
based on certain recurrent and prin-
cipled judicial approaches to the
record."
Ideology or interpretive
philosophy?
As previously noted, Table 3 shows
that even absent a pronounced ide-
ological tilt, the eight liberaljustices
are more likely to rely on legislative
history than the five Rehnquist
Court conservatives. The liberals'
more favorable view toward this his-
tory is distinctive in both eras: lib-
eral justices made use of legislative
history 21 percent more often than
conservative justices during the
Rehnquist years and 30 percent
more often during the Burger era.s0
Much of the difference for the
Rehnquist era reflects the arrival of
two conservative justices who are
implacably opposed to legislative
history reliance. Still, it remains
true as a general matter that liberal
justices are more inclined to value
legislative history than are their
conservative colleagues.
The difference in interpretive atti-
tudes with regard to legislative his-
such reliance did have an ideological dimension
in limited circumstances. For close cases (deci-
sions involving a vote margin of one or two
between majority and dissent), majority reliance
on legislative history was significantly more likely
to be associated with a liberal or pro-employee
result than for close decisions in which legislative
history was not part of the majority's explanation.
This finding may be primarily attributable to the
conduct of our eight liberal justices: they were
more likely to rely on legislative history in author-
ing close majorities with pro-employee results
than when authoring pro-employee decisions that
commanded wider vote margins. When the Court
is closely divided and issues a liberal decision, it is
perhaps not surprising that justices in the major-
ity tend to be both liberal (favoring pro-employee
results generally) and heavier users of legislative
history (see Table 3 and accompanying discus-
sion).
30. The Rehnquist Court differential is 39%
reliance for liberals and 18% for conservatives;
the Burger Court differential is 54% for liberals
and 24% for conservatives. The Burger Court
numbers for our group of conservative justices
include only 37 majority opinions: those authored
by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor.
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tory may well reflect a deeper fault
line involving judicial understand-
ings about how best to acknowledge
the lawmaking supremacy of Con-
gress. Although this separation of
powers debate is more complex than
can be adequately addressed here, a
few observations are in order.
Conservative federal judges in
recent decades have often been
skeptical whether legislative history
can be helpful in achieving fidelity to
congressionally enacted text. They
maintain that to be properly respect-
ful of Congress's constitutional role
as a unified lawmaking body, judges
should avoid or minimize reliance
on the unenacted intentions
expressed by various congressional
subgroups. Liberal judges, on the
other hand, have tended to view
evidence is inevitably influenced by
her reaction to the ideological thrust
of the statutes themselves. 1 This
study's findings on the ideologically
neutral aspects of legislative history
reliance by liberal justices suggest
that the divergence in approach
between these two groups may war-
rant additional explanation. While
further study should continue to
address the possible ideological
dimensions of legislative history
reliance, the differences observed
between the Court's two wings over a
36-year period may reflect interpre-
tive philosophy as well as ideological
strategy.
Concluding thoughts
This analysis of legislative history
reliance in Burger and Rehnquist
The Court's reliance on legislative
history turns out to be intriguingly
non-ideological in direction.
efforts to discern and apply the
intent of key legislative subgroups as
furthering their constitutional role
of junior partner in the lawmaking
enterprise. They assume that the
record of such intent can be evalu-
ated in a suitably cautious manner,
and therefore that legislative history
constitutes relevant and probative
evidence of what Congress was seek-
ing to accomplish.
Scholars in both law and social sci-
ence have suggested that this differ-
ence in attitudes must be
ideologically driven. Mindful of the
fact that most federal laws enacted
since the 1930s point in a liberal or
pro-regulatory direction, these schol-
ars contend that ajudge's willingness
to draw on legislative background
31. See, e.g., Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights
and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62 U.
CoLo. L. Rev. 37, 38-51 (1991); Stephen E Ross,
Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REv. 399, 420-25 (1989);Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert
Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices, 83 Am. POL. ScI. REv. 557, 562
(1989).
era majority opinions addresses a dis-
tinct subset of the Court's decision
docket. The focus on workplace law
covers only one-sixth of the Court's
caseload-a study of the Court's out-
put in other substantive areas might
yield additional findings.
Further, this study examines how
legislative history and other resources
are used to justify the Court's deci-
sions, not what actually accounts for a
majority author's judicial behavior.
Personal beliefs, policy preferences,
and strategic considerations surely
help shape the priority given to each
interpretive resource. It may be that
reliance on legislative history, like
reliance on Supreme Court prece-
dent, promotes principled justifica-
tions for outcomes that the justices
are inclined to reach anyway. The
analyses presented here offer advan-
tages in understanding the judicial
reasoning process, but do not pur-
port to identify the extent to which a
justice's individual value judgments
influence that reasoning process.
This study does, however, shed
light on the relevance and magni-
tude of several different factors that
help explain the Court's patterns of
reliance on legislative history. It is
evident that Justice Scalia has played
an important role in the Court's
declining use of this resource-both
through high profile resistance and
criticism expressed in his own opin-
ions, and through the influence he
seems to have had on the writings of
his colleagues.
Subject matter considerations also
have contributed to the Court's
growing reluctance to rely on the
legislative history resource. Sharp
declines in reliance have occurred
for statutes that aged notably during
the 36 years covered by the study. As
a regulatory scheme advances to
middle age or beyond, the Court
may well conclude that other inter-
pretive resources are more trustwor-
thy or malleable in clarifying and
developing the meaning of inconclu-
sive text.
Finally, the Court's reliance on leg-
islative history turns out to be
intriguingly non-ideological in direc-
tion. With respect to the Court as a
whole and distinctly ideological sub-
groups of justices, legislative history
reliance for liberal workplace law
statutes is associated with pro-
employer results more often than
one might expect. Several principled
explanations for these findings sug-
gest that the Court's use of legislative
history may be deliberative and
coherent in ways that legislative his-
tory skeptics have not imagined. V ,
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Books
Law versus science
and the problem
of eyewitness
identification
By Timothy S. Eckley
True Witness: Cops, Courts,
Science, and the Battle Against
Misidentification, by James M.
Doyle. Palgrave MacMillan. 2005.
223 pages. $24.95.
he haunting nature of Franz
Kaka 's The Trial lies in its every-
man aspect: the main character "K."
inexplicably finds himself mired in the
vagaries of an unfathomable legal system
from which he cannot escape. Imagine,
however if it were not fiction. Imagine
you were one of the thousands of innocent
people imprisoned in the United States for
a crime you did not commit.
In March, 1985, ex-marine Kirk
Noble Bloodsworth was tried and
convicted for the brutal murder and
sexual assault of a nine-year-old girl
and sentenced to death by a jury of
his peers. He was law enforcement's
prime suspect; the prosecution had
its man. Five eyewitnesses testified at
trial that they had seen Bloodsworth
with the victim. After serving two
years on death row, his conviction
was overturned and he was retried,
convicted a second time, and sen-
tenced to two consecutive life terms.
It was a crime he did not commit. It's
a crime that remains unsolved.
After serving nearly nine years in
prison as an innocent man, Blood-
sworth was exonerated through DNA
testing in 1993 and was released from
prison five months after his mother
passed away. He was the first person
exonerated from death row by post
conviction testing utilizing DNA sci-
entific advances. The details of Blood-
sworth's story are far from unique.
According to the Northwestern Jour-
nal of Criminal Law and Criminology
from 1989-2003 340 people were
exonerated in the United States. The
advent of DNA technology and
improved forensic techniques has
accelerated the rate of exonerations
beyond everyone's expectations, con-
comitantly exposing alarming weak-
nesses in the American criminal
justice system.
Documented exonerations in
America date at least as far back as
1820. What may be surprising, how-
ever, is that the oldest, most reliable,
most relied upon form of identifying
a criminal suspect-eyewitness iden-
tification-has been shown to
account for more wrongful convic-
tions than all other factors com-
bined. Frailties of human memory
and perception have been at the
heart of debates about the criminal
justice system in this country for
nearly 100 years. Only recently, how-
ever, in conjunction with the devel-
opment of peer-reviewed, verifiable
psychological science, has the legal
system truly begun to acknowledge
the prevalence of inaccurate eyewit-
ness identifications and to take steps
to prevent the inevitably tragic con-
sequences.
In True Witness, James Doyle pres-
ents fascinating insights into the
world of high-stakes academia fight-
ing to make a difference in main-
stream America. More precisely,
Doyle traces the history of the strug-
gle of social scientists attempting to
effect fundamental changes in the
American criminal justice system by
laying bare the too-often cata-
strophic results of blind adherence
to and faith in fickle aspects of
human nature.
Doyle launches frequent broad-
sides at the justice system, and
frankly universally indicts everyone
involved in the administration ofjus-
tice-law enforcement, lawyers,
judges-as being "derisive" towards,
"patronizing" of, "hostile" to, and
"reflexively" dismissive of psychology
specifically, and all of science gener-
ally. The oft-repeated criticism of the
court system as harboring an ongo-
ing "hostility" and "contempt"
towards science is overstated, but
that tone is consistent with the bal-
ance of this fascinating nonfiction
work on the history of psychology
and the law, which reads like a novel.
Doyle begins with an entertaining
redux of the turn of the 1 9 th century
heavyweight bout over the role of
psychology in the courtroom fought
by Hugo Munsterberg, the "father of
applied psychology," and Dean John
Henry Wigmore, a towering legal
scholar of the age. The story con-
cludes with Attorney General Janet
Reno, an unsung but crucial hero in
the "law-versus-psychology battle,"
and Iowa State psychology professor
Gary Wells and his vision of how
"psychology could play a role in
improving the world," by improving
the accuracy and reliability of eyewit-
ness identifications and procedures.
Doyle reports that "each year an esti-
mated 75,000 American prosecu-
tions turn on eyewitness evidence."
Doyle weaves throughout a massive
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amount of research the compelling
stories of death row exonerees and
the tribulations of heroic figures
committed to preventing such catas-
trophes in the future.
Challenging reliability
Hugo Munsterberg, Doyle notes, was
"alert enough to notice" that moral
issues in America "inexorably gravi-
tate toward the courts." (p.1 5 ) Mun-
sterberg published a series of essays,
ultimately collected in On the Witness
Stand, including a discourse titled
"The Memory of the Witness,"
wherein he challenged the reliability
of eyewitness accounts by relating his
own failed recollections in testimony
he gave during the trial of a sus-
pected burglar of his own home.
Alarmed and intrigued by the con-
tamination of his own prodigious
memory, Munsterberg set out to
demonstrate his self-revelations of
memory mistakes.
Munsterberg illustrated the relative
lack of correlation between a witness'
certainty in testifying to an event and
the accuracy of the testimony. He
demonstrated the phenomenon that
is becoming commonly known today
as "confirmatory bias," which includes
the theory that perception, memory,
and recall-the fundamental bases of
eyewitness testimony--are subject to
"suggestion, distortion, and omission,
[which] was very bad news for legal
procedure," according to Doyle. (p.
21) Doyle presents a fascinating ren-
dition of a "mock trial" between Wig-
more and Munsterberg on the law vs.
psychology debate and highlights the
crux of the matter: "The cross-exami-
nation of 'Muensterberg' revealed in
humbling fashion that when it came
to understanding which particular
witness produced a good, and which a
bad, verdict psychologists were, just
like lawyers, groping in the dark."
(p. 30)
Some 70 years later psychologist
Robert Buckhout noted the failure of
psychology to contribute significantly
to the prevention of faulty eyewitness
identification. By the same token, the
"Great Engine" of cross-examina-
tion-that most stalwart protector of
credibility in the courtroom-was like-
wise less than effective in preventing
false identifications and wrongful con-
victions. Buckhout, taking the fight
into the courtroom by way of expert
testimony, "attacked the videotape ver-
sion of eyewitness memory at length,
explaining that memory was actually a
delicate three-stage process of percep-
tion, storage, and recall, which was
vulnerable at every stage.., including
the social pressures inherent in the
environment of a lineup.., to identify
a suspect in order to please authority
figures." (p. 56) Despite the misgiv-
ings of many that the work of Buck-
hout and his colleagues was creating a
dangerous weapon for the benefit of
all criminal defendants, most of whom
are truly guilty, "by increasing juror
skepticism about all eyewitnesses," the
eyewitness identification reform
movement had at least gained a toe-
hold in the legal system.
Preventing misidentification
While the psychological experts were
indeed making inroads into the
courtroom the progress was slow and
the practical effect of their efforts
regarding eyewitness identification
was limited. Then along came Pro-
fessor Gary Wells. If the legal system
was unable sufficiently to identify or
rectify errors in eyewitness testimony
after they had been made, Gary
Wells has been instrumental in devel-
oping methods of preventing mis-
taken identities from occurring in
the first place. His formula of "esti-
mator variables" denominated fac-
tors the criminal justice system
cannot control, such as the race of
the perpetrator, circumstances
under which the event occurred, the
length of the criminal event, and the
like, and "system variables," which
are factors under the direct control
of the justice system, such as the
form and method of witness inter-
views, suspect interrogations, and
identification procedures. This
methodology enabled Wells to cham-
pion sequential, rather than simulta-
neous, line-ups and photo arrays.
By focusing on system variables,
Wells and his colleagues have been
able to posit additional practical
reforms in law enforcement's inter-
rogation and investigation proce-
dures that garner significantly fewer
misidentifications with only a mar-
ginal drop in positive identifications.
In 1997, a working group assembled
by Wells recommended to the crimi-
nal justice system four peer-reviewed,
"best practices:"
1. Double-blind testing. The per-
son supervising the identification
procedure should be unaware of
who the suspected perpetrator is in
order to avoid contaminating the wit-
ness' independent and objective
memory.
2. Improving instructions to wit-
nesses. Witnesses should be
instructed that the suspected crimi-
nal perpetrator "may, or may not, be"
in the line-up to reduce the number
of "false hits."
3. Selecting better "fillers," by
matching the witness' description of
the criminal, not law enforcement's
early suspect.
4. Gauging eyewitness confidence
immediately before the influence of
post-identification feedback. (pp.
164-65)
Advancing deliberately
The United States justice system suf-
fers a beating at the hands of James
Doyle. Introspective systems of jus-
tice, such as ours, do tend to move
more slowly than one might wish,
especially in an era of rapid scientific
advancement. Often, however, it
advances quite deliberately with
good reason. The courts have readily
embraced DNA technology, as they
have many, many other revolutionary
scientific advancements.
When confronted with novel sci-
entific evidence or theories, the
judge's role of gatekeeper of the
courtroom and guardian of the jury
must be played deliberately. As the
then Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia noted in 1923 'just
when a scientific principle or discov-
ery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable
stages is difficult to define. Some-
where in this twilight zone the evi-
dential force of the principle must
be recognized . . . ." Frye v. United
States, 293 E 1013, 1014 (1923). Writ-
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ing more recently for the United
States Supreme Court in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993),Justice Harry Black-
mun observed the "important differ-
ences between the quest for truth in
the courtroom and the quest for
truth in the laboratory. Scientific
conclusions are subject to perpetual
revision. Law, on the other hand,
must resolve disputes finally and
quickly." The struggle is great for
many reasons, including that it
threatens the traditional province of
the jury of determining matters of
credibility and the weight of evi-
dence, of which it is the role of the
presiding judge to protect. Even
Doyle acknowledges that "The sci-
ence will not stay frozen forever. Will
further research prove that sequen-
tial lineups are really no better than
simultaneous ones?" (p. 205)
As Doyle iterates, some reluctance
to accepting new scientific eyewitness
identification techniques stems from
the fear that guilty defendants, and
defense lawyers charged with repre-
senting them, would use the moun-
tains of information and scientific
studies to cast skepticism on all eye-
witness testimony no matter how
irrefutable it might otherwise be. If
the standard of proof is beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, and the crucial evi-
dence is eyewitness identification,
and any particular eyewitness identifi-
cation is shown to be the product of
procedure inconsistent with cutting
edge standards and is thus inherently
unreliable-the result is a dangerous
indictment of the entire criminal jus-
tice system. "The prosecutors thought
[Wells] was handing defense lawyers a
new weapon with which to beat the
cops over the head." (p. 173)
High stakes
The stakes involved with wrongful
convictions could not be higher. And
perhaps the justice system has
blindly or stubbornly held too long
to the notion of eyewitness infallibil-
ity. In this light, Doyle, the psycho-
logical researchers, and others are
justly impatient and frustrated with
the pace of reform. While Munster-
berg may have begun this struggle
nearly 100 years ago, it is really rela-
tively recently that the pioneering
work of Gary Wells and others has
been done. And even so, if not for
the advent of DNA technology, psy-
chology and overdue reform in eye-
witness identification procedures
would still be relegated to and sub-
ject to the vagaries of trench warfare
in the courtroom governed by a legal
system of rules and procedures that
by design is anathema to affirma-
tively imposing wholesale reform
beyond its own hallowed halls.
The courts, constrained by prece-
dent, are charged with and accus-
tomed to acting as referees, not
players, in the game of law enforce-
ment. Although they should not sit
passively in light of the recent devel-
opments in forensic eyewitness iden-
tification, they are not well suited to
effect systemic changes of this
nature. True Witness should serve as a
wake-up call for all stakeholders in
the administration of justice to rec-
ognize that only through broad
cooperation can meaningful system-
wide change be accomplished. vz;
TIMOTHY S. ECKLEY
is a staff attorney/publications
associate at the American Judicature
Society. (teckley@ajs.org)
*OOOOOOOOO@eoeeeeeeeeeegO@eeoeeoeeoee@eeoeeoeeeeeeeeeoeoeoeeoeeoe
Revolutionary
changes
by Sally J. Kenney
Building the UK's New Supreme
Court: National and Comparative
Perspectives, edited by Andrew Le
Sueur. Oxford University Press.
2004. 376 pages. $90.
F r a system that revels in tradition,
makes only the smallest incremen-
tal changes, and thinks modernizing
is a dirty word, the changes in the
judiciaries of the United Kingdom in
the last 10 years have been nothing
short of revolutionary. Devolving pow-
ers to Scotland, Northern Ireland
(where the Assembly is currently sus-
pended), and to a lesser extent,
Wales, has made those jurisdictions
the vanguard of electing women legis-
lators, instituting judicial nominating
commissions, and attempting to oper-
ationalize the concept of a represen-
tative judiciary.
Clearly on the agenda for a new
supreme court in the United King-
dom is the constitutional issue of
determining the relationship of the
parts to the whole. How will Scot-
land's independent civil law system
fit into a system of appeals, formerly
the purview of the Privy Council?
Should a judge from Northern Ire-
land have a guaranteed seat on the
House of Lords? Passage of the
Human Rights Act of 1998 has
brought into sharper focus the rela-
tionship with the U.K. as part of
international and supranational
institutions and the judicial systems
they created, the Council of Europe
(European Court of Human Rights)
and European Union (European
Court ofJustice), respectively.
Many of us who advocate for
reform, such as modernizing the
arcane (and discriminatory) system
of selecting judges, utilizing judicial
staff more effectively, curtailing
unlimited oral argument, and devel-
oping control over the appellate
docket hope that the debate engen-
dered by the passage of the Human
Rights Act and more recently in 2003
the abolition of the office of the
Lord Chancellor will place some of
these other reform issues squarely on
the public's agenda.
Into this milieu steps Professor
Andrew Le Sueur and his co-authors.
Building the UK's New Supreme Court:
National and Comparative Perspectives
offers lesson-learning from the high-
est constitutional courts in the
United States, Canada, Germany,
and Spain as well as the European
Court ofJustice and European Court
of Human Rights. The project on
which this book is based (the Consti-
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tution Unit) started in 1999 and this
volume includes the papers pre-
sented at two seminars in 2001. They
are relevant to the current debate
but, as they preceded it, do not
engage it directly.
What are the lessons?
Who is the audience for this text, I
wondered repeatedly as I read each
chapter. High-level civil servants con-
sidering models of reform? The
higher judiciary itself? Scholars such
as myself specializing in judicial
selection and the U.K.'s legal systems
more generally? Or scholars and stu-
dents of comparative law? Even the
most devoted in each group will find
it tough going reading from cover to
cover. Do we really need to know the
history of Scottish law from several
centuries past to figure out the route
of appeal of a new supreme court?
I'm not sure Scottish highlanders are
really comparable to native peoples
of Canada, or those in Northern Ire-
land to the Quebequois, but I'm will-
ing to be persuaded of the relevance
of the comparative example. Alas,
like too many volumes of so-called
comparative work, comparison
means considering a country other
than the dominant, in this case, the
United Kingdom. So we have inter-
esting articles about Spain, Germany,
Canada, and the United States, but
the chapters leave all lesson drawing
to the reader.
Several of the articles also have a
second flaw of much comparative
work: the authors are overly smitten
by their own countries marvelous suc-
cess in solving problems, in this vol-
ume, from federalism to managing
their caseloads. Happily, we have a
less sanguine view from Canada. If
policy makers are going to borrow
from one another, they need accu-
rate, even critical, assessments of pol-
icy as implemented, not the
propagandist's. Likewise, English
judges and defenders of the English
legal profession need to broaden
their perspective from the untested
and uncritical assumption of "the best
in the world" to consider the lessons
of other jurisdictions. Several of the
fine essays in the volume, such as Le
Sueur's ("Choosing Cases"), Kate
Malleson's ('judicial Appointments
in the Era of Human Rights and
Devolution"), and Richard Gordon's
("Relationships between Bench and
Bar") encourage them to do just that.
Judicature readers who are not aca-
demics might be interested in a
chapter or two on a relevant topic. I
learned something interesting and
important from each chapter,
although if I had not been a reviewer
I probably would have skipped over
more than half. Those who are
teaching about the U.K.'s legal sys-
tems have a relevant (if somewhat
dry, and descriptive rather than ana-
lytical) compilation that will serve
them well. Other teachers of com-
parative law will simply have to com-
pare the individual chapters to what
they already have on the jurisdiction
in question. The essays are relevant
and competent, but I am not in a
position to say that the chapter on
Spain, for example, is the best
overview in English.
Despite these criticisms, I look for-
ward to further work by the team at
the Constitution Unit. v
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What passes for
justice
by Mary T. Skerrett
Courtroom 302: A Year Behind the
Scenes in an American Criminal
Courthouse, by Steve Bogira.
Alfred A. Knopf. 2005. 416 pages.
$25
F orget everything you ever learned
in school about the criminal jus-
tice system. Steve Bogira will tell you
what really goes on in America's
courtrooms and how little it has to
do with justice. From his unique per-
spective as an observer in the Cook
County (Illinois) Criminal Court-
house, he lets us in on the daily
wheeling and dealing that passes for
justice in Courtroom 302: A Year
Behind the Scenes in an American Crim-
inal Courthouse. From the moment of
arrest until final determination, we
follow the poor and powerless
through a system that seeks not jus-
tice, but expediency. Courtroom 302
shows what has become typical in
Chicago's courtrooms and is about
"how justice miscarries every day, by
doing precisely what we ask it to do."
Steve Bogira is a prize-winning
writer for The Chicago Reader This
book is the result of a project fellow-
ship the author was awarded in 1993
to report on urban criminal courts
and the poor. Bogira spent the cal-
endar year of 1998 in the courtroom
of Judge Daniel Locallo observing
criminal court procedure, poring
over police reports and judicial deci-
sions, and interviewing everyone
involved in the process. He gives us
insight into the decision-making
processes of the power players-the
judge, the prosecutors and public
defenders; he also lets us in on dis-
cussions he had with those not in the
limelight such as Chicago police offi-
cers, bailiffs, court clerks, and court
reporters. However, the most inter-
esting and enlightening stories come
from his intimate conversations with
defendants, defendants' families, wit-
nesses, victims, and victims' fami-
lies-the masses that converge on
the courthouse every day with little
voice or influence over the paths
their lives will take after spending
time in Courtroom 302.
The courtroom background is a
noisy, chaotic, confused world in
which alleged offenders are herded
through the system as if cattle in a
stockyard. The immediate goal is
www.ajs.org JUDICATURE 233
HeinOnline  -- 89 Judicature 233 2005-2006
